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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction is conferred upon the appellate court pursuant
to § 78-2a-3, Utah Code Annot. (1953, as amended).

DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES AND
RULES
The following are the citations for the constitutional provisions, statutes ordinances and rules which Defendant cites herein
that may be determinative of the issues presented in this brief.
Each provision, statute or rule is set forth in its entirety in
the attached addendum.
Statutes:

§78-45-7.7 Utah Code Annot. (1990)
§78-45-7.8 Utah Code Annot. (1990)
Constitutions:
Constitution of the United States
Articles 5 and 14

Constitution of the State of Utah
Article 1, §§1, 6, 11 and 24

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

1.

The trial court did abuse its discretion in awarding

visitation

based

upon

Appellant/Defendant's

extended visitation which was

prior

history

of

controlled by Appellee/Plaintiff.

Visitation as established by the trial court severely limits the
ability

of

the

Defendant

and

children

to

maintain

their

relationship, maintenance of which is in the best interests of the
children.
2.

The fixed day care expenses set by the trial court is

inappropriate as it denies Defendant the protections allowed under
statute and requires him to pay day care when the children are not
with the day care provider*
3.

Plaintiff has no basis or need, in law or fact, for an

award of her attorney fees and costs incurred in the defense of
this matter.

She had an income well above that of Defendant and

this appeal raises real issues of law.
4.

Defendant has shown that the written findings of fact

for the order of modification of the decree of divorce do not
comport

with

the

significant areas.

oral

findings

announced

from

the

bench

in

Those findings should be amended to reflect

the findings of the court as reflected by the transcript.

4

ARGUMENT

APPELLANT HAS ESTABLISHED THAT THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED

ITS

DISCRETION IN THE AWARD OF VISITATION,
The first point is that the issue is not extended visitation
as Plaintiff would

have this court believe, but visitation in

total over the entirety of the year,

The fact is that with the

Plaintiff moving to California, weekend, usual holiday, and other
short period visitation is impractical, if not impossible.
The standard of review cited by Plaintiff, that of an abuse
of discretion, is the standard of review for custody issues.
issue presented in Nilson

v. Nilson,

The

652 P. 2d 1323 (Utah, 1982),

was "whether the evidence supports the trial court's determination
that the best interests of the children are served by awarding
custody of them

to the

Likewise Bake

Bake,

v.

custody modification.

mother/'

Nilson,

652 P.

2d at 1324.

772 P. 2d 461 (Utah App. 1989) dealt with
Bake,

772 P.2d at 462, and 464.

In fact, all cases cited by Plaintiff in this section of her
brief deal with custody only. Walker

v. Walker,

707 P.

2d 110

(Utah, 1985) tangentially dealt with a challenge on visitation,
wherein

the

court

discussed

whether

the

visitation

met

the

statute, or was unsupported by evidence and also discussed the
choice of a health care provider to determine "remission" of a
5

Walker,

mental impairment.

707 P. 2d at 112,

In Walker,

there

was extensive expert testimony concerning the visiting parent's
mental condition and how it affected relationships with the children.

Id.

In the instant case, there was only Plaintiff's admis-

sion that she wanted no visitation over one week in duration based
upon her fears. Transcript at 54, and 57 - 58.

Contrary to the

representations of Plaintiff in her brief, there was a timely objection to the alleged behavior of Defendant during the marriage.
See,

transcript at 33 at which point upon challenge, Plaintiff

simply indicated to the court that she would move on to other matters with the court so instructing her to do.

Hence that testi-

mony should have been excluded from consideration by the court.
Defendant does concur with Plaintiff that the best interests
of the children are of prime consideration.

This court has re-

cently discussed the value of visitation and stated that the best
interests

of

the

children

are

promoted

by

having

a

strong

relationship with the non-custodial parent by way of visitation.
Dana v.
case.

Dana,

789 P. 2d 726 (Utah Ct.App. 1990.) is one such

In Dana this court stated that "[f]ostering a child's rela-

tionship with the non custodial parent has an important bearing on
the child's best

interests."

Dana

789 P. 2d at 730 (citation

omitted).
This

court through

quoted Dana in Smith

v.

Judge
Smith,
6

Greenwood directly

affirmed and

793 P.2d 407 (Utah Ct. App. 1990),

addressing the value of visitation. This court stated that
"The best interests of a minor child are promoted by
having the child respect and love both
parents.
Postering a child's relationship with the non custodial
parent has an important bearing on the child's best interest.' Dana v. Dana, 789 P.2d 726, 730 (Utah Ct.App.
1990). Visitation by a non custodial parent helps to
develop this bonding of respect and love.
Interference
by the custodial parent with a non custodial parent's
visitation rights as ordered by the court may clearly be
contrary to a child's best interests.
Entwistle
v.
Entwistle,
61 A.D. 2d 380, 402 N.Y.S. 2d 2-13, 215-216
(1978) ("It is readily apparent that the respondent's
very act of preventing the [minor children] . . . from
seeing and being with their father is an act so inconsistent with the best interests of the children as to,
per se, raise a strong probability that the mother is
unfit to act as custodial parent.")
Smithy

793 P. 2d at 410 (emphasis and omissions in the origi-

nal ).
By significantly decreasing the amount of time that Defendant
has with the minor children in this case, the trial court has
severely limited the ability to foster and maintain those bonds of
love and affection referred to in Smith.

In raising this issue,

Defendant does not assert "mathematical precision" as Plaintiff
asserts, Defendant uses the numbers to show in an easily understand way just how much his access to the children is significantly decreased.
That

is

also the

reason

for

Defendant's citation to the

standardized visitation schedule set forth by the Third District
court.

Quite simply stated,
7

Defendant is deprived of visitation,

a valuable opportunity to foster his relationship with his sons,
to an extent well below that which he and the two boys would enjoy
under those guidelines, simply because Plaintiff

removed those

children from this state.
When there is a change of circumstance, consisting of the
removal of the children from this state, does the visitation order
that

existed

change?

before

that

change

control

visitation after

the

Defendant asserts that it does not control the subsequent

visitation.

Defendant and the two boys should have at least as

much access to visitation to foster the parent-child relationship,
as they enjoyed it before the move, if the same can realistically
and economically be accomplished.
The

standardized

Defendant

a

Defendant's

visitation

calculable

number

relationship with

schedule
of

the

would

have

granted

to

enhance

opportunities

two

children.

Commissioner

Arnett's recommendation is representative of an experienced commissioner attempting to approach that amount of time spent with
the children.

While his statements are merely a recommendation

and made without benefit of full trial, they are reflective of a
person with knowledge

and ability

in these matters based upon

hearing representations of the same facts and arguments of the
parties later heard by Judge Stirba.
circumstances
awarded.

and

recommended

more

He recognized the changed
visitation

than

the

court

The trial court made its award based upon Defendant's
8

historical extended visitation record, that Plaintiff controlled.
Record at 174 - 175 and transcript at 57.
If this court finds that the abuse of discretion standard is
the

appropriate

standard

to

be

applied

in

this

case,

then

Defendant has shown that the court has abused its discretion in
severely limiting Defendant's visitation to less than he had before the change.

This action of the trial court severely affects

Defendant's relationship with the

children, the

maintenance of

which is recognized as being in the best interests of the children, and is not support by any finding of harm, past or present,
to the children in allowing a comparable amount of visitation.

THE

CHILD

INAPPROPRIATE

AND

CARE

EXPENSE

DEFENDANT

AWARD

HAS

SHOWN

IS

UNREASONABLE

THAT

THE

AWARD

AND
WAS

UNREASONABLE.
Plaintiff's recognition of the

fact that

§§ 78-45-7.7 and

-7.8, Utah Code Annot. (1990) apply to this case is very helpful
to Defendant, for that is very much the basis for this part of
Defendant's appeal of the trial court's ruling.

Plaintiff's cir-

cular argument on this issue shows the dilemma faced by Defendant.
Plaintiff asserts that Defendant has the protections afforded
by those statutes, yet relies on the flat monthly payment.
the flat monthly payment, there is no accounting.
to work properly, require an accounting.
9

With

These statutes,

Defendant has shown that

Plaintiff tried to charge him with day care costs for her honeymoon and Plaintiff has

never denied

this point.

Without the

accounting, how does the Defendant know that the expense is not
being incurred so that he may suspend payment as allowed under the
statute?

Furthermore, why is it that when Defendant did attempt

to suspend payment during a time when the two boys were with him
for two two-week periods that Plaintiff filed an order to show
cause for payment for those two periods, obtained a finding that
Defendant had to pay Plaintiff for day care for those periods and
that Defendant was not to again attempt such a termination of payment?
This is the exact quandary which Defendant faces.

He cannot

know exactly what is being spent for day care, whether day care is
work related nor can he stop paying if the children are receiving
day care. The record in this matter shows a history of abuses by
Plaintiff of the day care claims.
and 259 - 261.

Record at 253 - 254, 256 - 257,

This is a clear statement of the error the trial

court made in making this determination and the clear violation of
the intent of these statutory safeguards.
There is a second aspect of Defendant's appeal on this issue,
which

is the

question

of

whether

it is

reasonable under the

statutes that the day care provider be "on call" while the children are
care.

in school and that this "on call" be equated with day

The trial court included this "on call" status as day care.
10

Transcript at 7 8 - 7 9 .
The transcript shows that there was no "on call" person until
just

a

couple

of

Transcript at 45.

months

before

the

trial

of

this

matter.

The children had day care only after school.

Id.
Plaintiff also assert that her new husband is an appropriate
provider for the children.

Plaintiff's counterclaim at HH 2d and

3g. and record at 146 and 148, respectively.

Therefore there are

two adults available for emergencies at school.
The statutes involved herein concern work related day care to
the children, not mere "on call" while the children are in school.
It is an abuse of discretion to require Defendant to pay for onehalf of this "on call" status where there is no direct benefit to
the children.

PLAINTIFF SHOULD NOT BE AWARDED HER ATTORNEY FEE'S AND COSTS
INCURRED IN THE DEFENSE OF THIS MATTER.
The Plaintiff now raises a claim for an award of her attorney
fees and costs incurred on appeal.

The cases cited by Plaintiff

upon close examination do not fully support her stated position.
Carter

v.

Carter,

584 P. 2d 904 (Utah, 1978), did allow that

defendant an award of attorney fees on appeal.
at 906.

Carter^

584 P. 2d

That was not based upon §30-3-3, Utah Code Annot. (1953,
11

as amended).

A review of Carter

shows no citation of a Utah Code

section in the entirety of the opinion.
Furthermore, the award of attorney fees in Carter

is based

solely upon defendant's request, without any basis other than the
fact that the plaintiff therein prosecuted the appeal.

Justice

Maughn raised this point in his dissent wherein he dissented "from
the rationale used to support the award of costs and

attorney

fees, on appeal, to defendant, viz., because plaintiff was unwilling to

abide by

the trial court judgment.

appears to me to be in

terrorem.

"

This type of "in terrorem"

Carter,

Such a rationale

584 P. 2d at 906.

has been limited by this court,

otherwise every losing party would be responsible for the fees and
costs of the winning party on appeal.

Such a rule would have an

extreme chilling effect upon the entire appellate process.
Chilling of the right to appeal has been a concern of this
court for some time.

In Maughn,

770 P. 2d 156 (Utah Ct.App, 1989),

cited by Plaintiff as being authority on this issue, this court
stated that requests for attorney fees and costs on appeal are
generally pursuant to Rule 33, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure
and that such sanctions would be "applied only in egregious cases,
*lest

there

be

an

improper

chilling

erroneous lower court decisions.'"

of

Maughn,

the

right

to

appeal

770 P.2d at 162.

Maughn is also distinguishable from the instant case in another way.

Besides asking for an award of fees and costs under
12

Rule

33,

Utah

Rules

of

Appellate

Procedure, Paulette

Maughn

claimed that she could not afford the appeal, and as the trial
court

had

Maughn,

awarded

her

attorney

770 P. 2d at 162.

fees,

so

should

this

court.

This court recognized the record of

Paulette Maughn*s financial need and exercised its discretion in
awarding Paulette Maughn her attorney fees on appeal.

Maughn,

770

P. 2d at 163.
In the instant case, attorney fees were awarded to neither
party at the trial court level.
that.

Neither party has challenged

Furthermore, the record clearly shows that Plaintiff is not

in financial need, having a monthly income of almost twice that of
Defendant. Transcript at 12, 26, 48, and 67, and record at 169 175.

Therefore, there is no basis under Maughn for an award of

fees and costs to Plaintiff.
In Dahlberg

v.

Dahlberg,

292 P. 214 (Utah, 1930), Plaintiff

was awarded attorney fees on appeal. Dahlberg^
Plaintiff was the one who brought the appeal.
defending the appeal.

292 P. at 218.

But

Plaintiff was not

This is the exact opposite of the position

of the Plaintiff in the

instant case and supports the position

that the Defendant in this case should be awarded his fees and
costs incurred in prosecuting this appeal.
Returning to the improper chilling referred to in Maughn,

the

Plaintiff cites as the basis for an award of attorney fees the
fact that Defendant is a licensed attorney allowed to practice law
13

in this state.

Plaintiff does not ask the court to consider the

financial status of the parties,

Plaintiff was earning approxi-

mately twice that which Defendant was earning (transcript at 67),
nor does she cite that this matter is frivolous or unfounded, two
of the major basis for and award of fees on appeal.
An award of
attorney,
clauses

if

of

attorney

allowed,
the

fees based

would

United

be

States

violative

Defendant's being an
of

Constitution

Constitution of the State of Utah.
States Constitution and

on

equal
as

protection

well

Articles 5 and

as

the

14, United

§§1, 7, 11 and 24 of Article 1 of the

Constitution of the State of Utah.

It would be singling out a

class of citizens, attorneys, as being liable for fees incurred in
litigation involving those attorneys personally.

What could be

more chilling to attorneys who are personally involved in suits
but that the

specter of an

order of

attorney

fees and costs

against them is very likely simply because that individual is an
attorney?
Furthermore, how would

the court handle pro se litigants.

Pro se litigants, by definition, do not incur any attorney fees on
their part.

Should all pro se litigants have to pay the opposing

party's attorney fees and costs on appeal?

Defendant respectfully

suggests that such a stance would have such a chilling effect upon
pro se litigation that individuals would not dare to litigate a
matter, or prosecute an appeal, pro se.
14

So if pro se litigants can come before the courts of this
land without automatically being subject to a judgment for attorney

fees

against

them

because

of

their

status,

why

should

Defendant pay Plaintiff's attorney fees even if for the sake of
argument he has assisted his counsel in the prosecution of this
matter?

This court must find

some other reason and basis and

Defendant asserts that there is no other such reason or basis.
It is clear from the content of this appeal and the issues
presented that this case is one of first impression, and that a
request for the interpretation of the statutes raised and rules
referred to in this matter is permitted.

DEFENDANT HAS MARSHALLED THE EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT HIS CLAIM
THAT SOME

OF

THE

WRITTEN

FINDINGS ENTERED BY

THE COURT WERE

ERRONEOUS.
Plaintiff asserts that Defendant's challenge that some of the
written findings are clearly erroneous must fail due to her allegation that Defendant has failed to marshal evidence as required
under Saunders

v.

Sharp,

806 P. 2d 198, 199 (Utah, 1991).

This

assertion is contained in one paragraph at the end of point 1 of
Plaintiff's argument.
Defendant has marshalled the evidence.

There is a transcript

of the pronouncement of findings from the bench.
70-82.

Transcript

at

Defendant's objection notes the specific errors in the
15

written findings.

Record at 211-213.

Those written additions to

the oral pronouncement of the court which were objected to by
Defendant's counsel were clearly never orally stated by the court,
otherwise the transcript would contain them.

The

discrepancies

between the oral pronouncement as contained in the transcript and
the written findings constitute sufficient evidence under
to substantiate Defendants claims on this issue.

Saunders

This court may

properly consider those oral findings expressed from the bench by
way of the transcript.

Merriam

v.

Merriam,

799 P. 2d 1172 (Utah

Ct.App., 1990).

CONCLUSION
The Defendant has established that the trial court abused its
discretion in its award of visitation by substantially limiting
the

time

allowed

the

Defendant

with

the

two

boys

and

in

considering the limited amount of visitation allowed by Plaintiff
prior to Plaintiff's move to California as a basis for limiting
Defendant's ongoing visitation.
Defendant has shown that the trial court has erred in its
award of a fixed amount of day care where that day care includes
"on call" periods when the children are not present.

The court

further erred by denying the protections allowed to Defendant by
the statutes cited above in its setting of a flat fee without any

16

requirement to show that the day care is actually work-related.
Defendant should be granted the full benefit of the protection
allowed by those statutes as argued by Defendant and admitted by
Plaintiff in her brief.
Plaintiff should not be awarded her attorney fees and costs
incurred in the defense of this appeal.

Plaintiff has shown no

basis or need in law or fact for that such an award.
Defendant has marshalled sufficient evidence to show that the
challenged portions of the written findings of fact do not comport
with the ruling of the court.

Therefore those findings must be

amended to following the oral findings as supported by the transcript in this matter.

Respectfully submitted this X ' day of March, 1993.

k
7

' KATHRYN S. DENHOLM, ESQ.
Attorney for Appellant / Defendant
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Attorney for Defendant / Appellant

ADDENDUM

Amend. V

CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES

AMENDMENT V
[Criminal actions — Provisions concerning — Due process
of law and just compensation clauses.]
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous
crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases
arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in
time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same
offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for
public use, without just compensation.

AMENDMENT VI
[Rights of accused.]
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy
and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the
crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously
ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of
counsel for his defence.

AMENDMENT VII
[Trial by jury in civil cases,]
In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty
dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury,
shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common law.

AMENDMENT VIII
[Bail — Punishment.]
Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel
and unusual punishments inflicted.

20

AMENDMENTS

Amend. XIV, § 3

AMENDMENT XIV
Section
1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal
protection.]
2. [Representatives — Power to reduce appointment.]
3. [Disqualification to hold office.]

Section
4. [Public debt not to be questioned — Debts of
the Confederacy and claims not
to be paid.]
5. [Power to enforce amendment.]

Section 1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal
protection.]
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

Sec. 2. [Representatives — Power to reduce appointment.]
Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to
their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each
State, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any election
for the choice of electors for President and Vice-President of the United States,
Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial Officers of a State, or
the members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United
States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other
crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion
which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of
male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State.

Sec. 3. [Disqualification to hold office.]
No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or Elector of
President and Vice President, or hold any office, civil or military, under the
United States, or under any State, who, having previously taken an oath, as a
member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a member of
any State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any State, to
support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies
thereof. But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such
disability.
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Art. I, § 1

DECLARATION OF RIGHTS

ARTICLE I
DECLARATION OF
RIGHTS
Section
1. [Inherent and inalienable
rights.]
2. [All political power inherent in the people.]
3. [Utah inseparable from the Union.]
4. [Religious liberty - No property quahfica6. [Habeas c o S t f
"
6. [Right to bear arms.]
7. [Due process of law.]
8. (Offenses bailable]
9. [Excessive bail and fines — Cruel punishmenta.]
10. [Trial by jury.]
11. (Courts open — Redress of injuries J
12. (Rights of accused persons]
13. [Prosecution by information or indictment
— Grand jury.]
14. [Unreasonable searches forbidden — Issuance of warrant.]

Section
16. [Freedom of speech and of the press — Libe!.]
1 6 . [ N o imprisonment for debt — Exception.]
1 7 # ( E l e c t l 0 I i a to ^ f r e e _ s ^ ^ , v o t m g . ]
* lAttainder^ Ex post fact, laws-Impair.
« * «ntr«d^l
1 0 rffV.
19
- [Treason defined — Proof]
20
* (Military subordinate to the cml power.]
21. [Slavery forbidden ]
22. [Private property for public use.]
23. [Irrevocable franchises forbidden.]
24. (Uniform operation of laws ]
26. [Rights retained by people.]
2 6. (Provisions mandatory and prohibitory.]
2 7. [Fundamental rights.]

Section 1. [Inherent and inalienable rights.]
All men have the inherent and inalienable right to enjoy and defend their
lives and liberties; to acquire, possess and protect property; to worship according to the dictates of their consciences; to assemble peaceably, protest against
wrongs, and petition for redress of grievances; to communicate freely their
thoughts and opinions, being responsible for the abuse of that right.
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Sec. 7. [Due process of law.]
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process

Sec* 11. [Courts open — Redress of injuries.]
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to him in his
person, property or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, which
shall be administered without denial or unnecessary delay; and no person
shall be barred from prosecuting or defending before any tribunal in this
State, by himself or counsel, any civil cause to which he is a party.

Sec. 24. [Uniform operation of laws.]
All laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation.
History: Const 1896.
Cross-References. — Prohibition on pri-

vate or special laws, Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec
26.

